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The accession of ten new member states in May 2004 and the prospective accession of several more in the near 
future will pose severe budgetary, administrative, and operational challenges for the European Union. But however 
great, the challenges of enlargement pale in comparison with the challenges of accession that will be faced by the 
new member states, especially those which until a decade ago were governed by Communist parties that presided 
over centrally-planned and predominantly-collectivized economies. This paper explores five of the most critical 
challenges that will face the new member states of post-Communist Europe: 1) administering the acquis; 2) 
deepening and extending the reform and transformation of the economy; 3) reducing the high levels of 
unemployment and large government, trade, and current account deficits; 4) financing accession in the face of the 
EU's budgetary constraints and financial provisions; and 5) coping with all of those challenges in the face of low 
levels of support for enlargement in many of the member states and high levels of ambivalence and skepticism 
about membership in most of the new member states. The chapter concludes by noting the low levels of trust in 
the national government and satisfaction with the way democracy works that exist in most of the new member 
states and suggests that those low levels of trust and satisfaction will make it difficult for the governments in the 
new member states to address these challenges while also maintaining sufficient public support to retain office. 
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On May 1, 2004, ten countries–Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Es-
tonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, and Malta–joined the European Union.1 More are likely to join in the near future.2 
The enlargement of the EU will pose severe budgetary, administrative, and operational challenges for the Union. 
Indeed, it was in anticipation of the latter that the member states of the EU negotiated the Treaty of Nice in 2000 
and agreed to changes in the composition of the Commission, the representation of the member states in the 
Parliament, the weights of the states in qualified majority votes in the Council, the scope of majority voting, and 
the extent to which states could participate in cooperative action with other like-minded members. And it was to a 
large extent the anticipation of the institutional complications posed by enlargement that caused the member states 
to convene a Convention in 2002 to consider possible further changes to the treaties.3 
As considerable as the challenges of enlargement for the EU are, they pale in comparison with the chal-
lenges of accession for the new members, especially those which until a decade ago were governed by Communist 
parties that presided over centrally-planned and predominantly-collectivized economies. Those challenges include: 
1) administering the acquis; 2) deepening and extending the reform and transformation of the economy; 3) reducing 
high levels of unemployment and large government, trade, and current account deficits; 4) financing accession in 
the face of the EU’s budgetary constraints and financial provisions; and 5) coping with all of those challenges in 
the face of high levels of ambivalence about membership in most of the new member states and low levels of 
support for enlargement in most of the other member states. This chapter describes those challenges. 
The Challenges of Accession  
Administering the Acquis. As a result of the accession negotiations, the candidate countries agreed to 
adopt the entire acquis of the EU with only a few transitional phase-ins, such as those pertaining to the sale of land 
and the movement of persons. That acquis, accumulated over a period of up to a half-century, often represented 
the amendment or incremental adjustment of prior policy and very often it resulted from protracted political 
negotiation among the member states and within the institutions of the EU. But on May 1, 2004, the new 
members found themselves committed by treaty to implementing the entire acquis (except for the few elements for 
which transitional waivers were negotiated) and treating it as their own. As of that day, both the processes and 
outcomes of policy across virtually every domain of policy were transformed. It does not exaggerate greatly to say 
that, upon accession, the new members were recreated as states, committed to processes of policymaking and 
policy outcomes that in many instances bear little or no relation to their prior domestic policymaking processes and 
                     
1Presented at the Conference on the Dilemmas of Europeanization: Politics and Society in Eastern and Central Europe 
after EU Enlargement, Harvard University, December 2003. An earlier version appeared with the same title in East European 
Politics and Societies 17,1 (2003): 20-37. 
2Bulgaria completed accession negotiations in June 2004 and is scheduled to join the EU in 2007. Romania has provisionally 
closed twenty-four of the thirty-one chapters of the accession negotiations and is expected to join in 2007 as well. In June 
2004, the leaders of the EU accepted the Commission’s recommendation that Croatia be regarded as a candidate and that 
accession negotiations begin in 2005. In December 2004, the leaders will decide, based upon a recommendation of the 
Commission, whether negotiations should be opened with Turkey. Four countries in the western Balkans–Albania, Bosnia, 
Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro–are expected to apply at some point in the future. 
3The Convention, which consisted of two representatives of the national parliaments and one representative of the govern-
ments of the fifteen member states and thirteen accession candidates plus sixteen members of the European Parliament, 
two members of the Commission, and a three-man presidency, met from February 2002 until June 2003 and prepared a 
draft treaty that would establish a constitution for the EU. An Intergovernmental Conference began considering the draft 
treaty in October 2003. The heads of state and government were divided over several issues and unable to reach an 
agreement at Brussels in December 2003 but eventually resolved all of the divisive issues and agreed to a treaty in June 
2004. The treaty will be signed in October 2004 and then considered for ratification by the twenty-five member states. See 
Cameron, 2004.  
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policy decisions but reflect, instead, the politics, policymaking processes, and policy choices of the EU and its 
earlier member states. 
The new member states have, in a sense, agreed to accept that remaking of the state and its policy pro-
cesses as the necessary price to be paid for the putative benefits of membership. But even if they do not find it ob-
jectionable to be committed to implementing tens of thousands of pages of directives, regulations, and policy re-
quirements in the formulation of which they had no influence, the question arises as to whether the new members 
will be able to implement the acquis. It is by no means apparent that their governments–especially those formed by 
coalitions of parties or lacking a parliamentary majority–will have the political capacity to adopt the policies 
required by or consistent with the acquis in the face of domestic opposition. Nor is it apparent they will have the 
administrative capacity to implement the acquis and the policies that follow from it. 
At Madrid in 1995, the European Council recognized that, in addition to satisfying the criteria for mem-
bership articulated at Copenhagen in 1993–the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and 
human rights; the existence of a functioning market economy; and the ability to take on all of the obligations of 
membership–the candidate countries would have to insure that their administrative and judicial structures were 
capable of implementing the acquis. By mid-2002, the EU had negotiated “action plans” for creating adequate 
administrative and judicial capacity with all of the candidate countries. But will those “action plans” suffice? Will 
they provide the layers of national, subnational, and sectoral administrative expertise necessary in order to 
implement the acquis on a day-to-day basis? Can state capacity be created simply by implementing an “action plan”? 
And will those plans in fact be fully implemented now that they have joined the Union? 
The extent of the challenge confronting the new member states with regard to implementing and en-
forcing the acquis is well illustrated in the Commission’s “Comprehensive Monitoring Report.”4 The Report, issued 
in October 2003, describes the state of preparedness for membership of the ten countries. It makes it apparent 
that there are many domains of policy in which the implementation and enforcement of the acquis requires either 
enhanced efforts on the part of the governments of the new member states or even immediate and decisive action. 
For example, it concluded that Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and the three Baltic states need to take 
immediate and decisive action with regard to training requirements and mutual recognition of qualifications for 
professionals. The Slovak Republic needs to do likewise with regard to fiscal aids for its steel industry, legislation 
pertaining to food safety and health, and procedures dealing with payments to farmers. The Czech Republic needs 
to do likewise with regard to food safety, health matters, and road transport. Hungary needs to do likewise with 
regard to its provisions for the distribution of rural development aid and payments to farmers. Lithuania needs to 
do likewise with regard to the inspection and control of its fishing fleet. Estonia needs to do likewise with regard to 
its labor law and provisions for equal treatment. Latvia needs to do likewise with regard to its laws pertaining to the 
disposal of animal waste. And Poland needs to do likewise with regard to legislation governing the certification of 
veterinarians, the movement of animals, the disposal of animal waste, food safety and health issues, procedures for 
making payments to farmers and fisheries, and inspection and control of the fishing fleet. 
In addition to those issues, all of which require immediate and decisive action, the Commission identified 
a much longer list of issues, involving all aspects of the internal market, public procurement, financial services, 
competition policy, industrial policy, intellectual and industrial property rights, agriculture and fisheries, rural 
development, Economic and Monetary Union, social policy, and, indeed, virtually every other domain of policy, in 
which one or more of the new member states and the other accession candidates need to increase their effort to 
implement and enforce the acquis. The Commission made it clear that accession would not be delayed because of 
the shortcomings in implementation of the acquis. But it also made it clear that the pressure to implement the acquis 
                     
4European Commission, 2003a.  
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would not abate once the countries had entered the Union and that they would have no choice but to comply with, 
and enforce, the acquis once they had joined. 
  Extending the Reforms. In addition to implementing the acquis, the new member states of central and 
eastern Europe face the challenge of extending and deepening the reforms that have been underway for the past 
decade that are designed to create the regulatory institutions, norms, and policies characteristic of a market-
oriented economy.5 In domains such as the liberalization of trade and foreign exchange, price liberalization, and 
small-scale privatization, the reforms have progressed to such an extent that their economies are, or soon will be, 
comparable to those of the typical advanced industrial economy. But in other aspects of policy such as corporate 
governance and enterprise restructuring, the regulation of securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, 
and competition policy, reform has not progressed to the same extent. 
Table 1 (tables begin on page 14) presents measures of the extent of reform in eight aspects of economic 
and regulatory activity in the eight central and eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 as well as 
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. These measures, reported by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, consist of values assigned by the EBRD on an eleven-point scale ranging from 1, denoting little 
progress, to 4.3, denoting the existence of standards and performance norms comparable to those of advanced 
industrial economies.6 The data in Table 1 indicate that all of the countries except Romania had reformed their 
trade and foreign exchange policies to such an extent that by 2003 they had attained the standards and perform-
ance norms of advanced industrial countries. All but Estonia, Slovenia, and Croatia had attained that standard with 
respect to price liberalization. And all of the countries that entered the EU in 2004 as well as Croatia have attained 
that same standard with regard to small-scale privatization. But as one moves from those domains to the others–
large-scale privatization, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, reform of corporate governance and 
enterprise restructuring, the development of regulatory institutions in the non-banking financial sector and 
securities markets, and the development of an effective competition policy–reform has progressed to a lesser 
extent. Even those countries which have experienced the greatest degree of reform to date–Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, and Poland–still fall well short of the standard and performance norms of the advanced 
industrial economies in those other domains.  
If the governments of the new member states and accession candidates are to enjoy the same degree of 
regulatory authority vis-à-vis the market that exists in the other member states of the EU, the extent and pace of 
reform will have to progress substantially, especially in the several aspects of policy in which progress to date have 
been slowest. Without that regulatory authority, governments in the new member states will lack the ability to 
promote effective corporate governance and enterprise restructuring, facilitate the development and maintenance 
of stable banking and non-banking financial institutions that can provide capital and liquidity to enterprises, and 
maintain a competitive operating environment free of abuses of market power–all of which will be necessary in 
order to attract investment from domestic and foreign sources and enable firms to compete effectively in the single 
internal market of the EU. 
Unlike the experience of most if not all of the earlier member states, which accumulated the regulatory in-
stitutions, norms, and policies appropriate to a market-oriented economy over a long period of time, most of the 
new member states and accession candidates have had to develop those institutions, norms, and policies in a very 
short period and without the benefit of a long prior accumulation of appropriate institutions, norms, and policies. 
Given the pace of regulatory institution-building over the past decade, it seems most unlikely they will attain the 
standards and performance norms of most of the earlier member states in the near future. As a result, they will 
                     
5In the discussion that follows, I concentrate on the challenges that will face the new member states of central and eastern 
Europe. 
6European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2003: p. 16.  
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confront not only the complex task of implementing the acquis but the even more difficult task of creating, without 
the normal long gestation period enjoyed by the earlier members, new regulatory institutions and policies in a 
variety of economic domains. 
Reducing Unemployment and the Government and Trade Deficits. In addition to facing the chal-
lenges of implementing the acquis and extending the institutional and economic policy reforms, the states that 
joined the EU in 2004 or will join in the next few years will confront a serious macroeconomic challenge posed by 
the existence of high rates of unemployment and large government and trade deficits. 
Table 2 presents the EU’s most recent economic forecasts for the ten new member states and Bulgaria 
and Romania.7 Among other things, the forecasts indicate that five of the countries are expected to have rates of 
unemployment at or above 10 percent of the civilian labor force in 2004 and 2005, despite rather robust and in-
creasing rates of economic growth. In 2004, for example, the unemployment rate is expected to be between 10 and 
12 percent in Latvia and Lithuania, 13 percent in Bulgaria, 17 percent in the Slovak Republic, and 20 percent in 
Poland.8 In Estonia it will be close to 10 percent. And in the Czech Republic it will be over 8 percent. While 
decreasing slightly in all of the countries in 2005, it is apparent that the enlargement of 2004 brought into the 
Union a group of states that, notwithstanding their quite robust rates of growth, confront unusually high rates of 
unemployment.  
One means by which governments in the new member states and accession candidates could provide an 
employment-generating stimulus to the economy involves increasing public spending and/or decreasing public 
revenues to such an extent that the size of the budget deficit, relative to the size of the economy, increases. But as 
they wrestle with the problem of continuing high unemployment, some of the new member states–most notably, 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and the Slovak Republic–will find their ability to provide a further fiscal 
stimulus limited by the fact that their budget deficits are already quite large. As the new members chart a course 
toward their obligatory full participation in Economic and Monetary Union–by their accession treaties, they 
entered the third and final stage of EMU with derogations pending their fulfillment of the convergence criteria–and 
confront the need to bring their budget deficits into line with these criteria, they will find themselves under 
pressure to reduce their budget deficits, even at the cost of introducing a contractionary impulse into the economy 
that results in even higher rates of unemployment. Indeed, in early July 2004, following recommendations made by 
the Commission, the Council invoked the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact and directed the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, as well as Malta and Cyprus, to bring their budget deficits down 
to under 3 percent of GDP in 2005-08.9 
In addition to high rates of unemployment and large government deficits, most of the central and eastern 
European countries that have joined or soon will join the EU have unusually large trade deficits. They are espe-
cially large in Cyprus, Malta, and the three Baltic states. In Estonia and Latvia, for example, they are expected to be 
in the range of 17 to 22 percent of GDP in 2004 and 2005, and in Lithuania they are expected to be in the vicinity 
of 9 percent of GDP. To some extent, the imbalance between imports and exports of goods is offset in the current 
account by inflows derived from short-term investments, tourism, etc. But all of the new member states and 
candidate countries–especially the three Baltic states–are expected to have substantial current account deficits that 
will have to be financed through the attraction of long-term investment from abroad or international borrowing. 
The existence of a large trade and current account deficit in most of the new member states will inevitably 
create pressure to reduce the deficit either by increasing exports or decreasing imports or both. One might think 
                     
7European Commission, 2004a. 
8In the first half of 2004, the unemployment rate in Croatia was 17.4 percent. 
9The Czech Republic and Hungary were given until 2008 to meet the deficit limit. Poland and the Slovak Republic were 
given until 2007. Malta was given until 2006. And Cyprus (along with Greece) was given until 2005.  
 
  6
their accession to the EU and its large market will allow them to repair those deficits by substantially increasing 
their exports to the other member states. However, as the data in Table 3 demonstrate, the trade of most of the 
new member states and accession candidates is already highly concentrated in the EU.10 Most of them already 
depend on EU markets for the purchase of more than three-fifths of their exports and most of them nevertheless 
incur a substantial deficit in their trade with the current member states of the EU. Those facts do not necessarily 
preclude the possibility that the new members will be able to repair their trade deficits through an expansion of 
exports to the current EU. But it does suggest that accession is unlikely to provide a quick fix for the structural 
imbalances that exist in their economies and that in order to reduce those imbalances they will have to improve the 
ability of their enterprises to compete in both domestic and international markets–something that will require not 
only the continued reform of regulatory institutions and policies noted earlier but a substantial reallocation of 
production, investment, and employment between and within the sectors of the economy. 
While all of the new member states will face the challenge of transforming their economies so as to in-
crease their competitiveness in the EU, that challenge will be more daunting in some than in others. Table 4 pre-
sents measures of the relative degree of economic development of the ten post-Communist countries and the size 
of their agricultural sectors, both in terms of employment and value added.11 By comparing the latter two 
measures, one can estimate the extent to which productivity in the agricultural sector lags behind that in the other 
sectors of each country’s economy. All else being equal, one would expect the countries with relatively high levels 
of GDP per capita, relatively small portions of the labor force employed in agriculture, and agricultural sectors in 
which productivity approximates that of the other sectors of the economy to face a less daunting task of economic 
transformation than those with relatively low levels of GDP per capita, relatively large portions of the work force 
employed in agriculture, and relatively low levels of productivity in agriculture compared with the other sectors of 
the economy. To the extent that is true, we would expect the sectoral transformation of the economy to be 
somewhat less difficult in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia, as well as in the Slovak Republic and 
Estonia, than in Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as in Bulgaria and Romania. In the latter countries, the 
combination of relatively low levels of economic development, relatively large agricultural sectors in terms of 
employment, and relatively low rates of agricultural productivity suggest that the transformation of the economy 
will be unusually difficult and will, in all likelihood, generate significant additional unemployment. 
Financing Accession. As if the challenges of implementing the acquis while also extending the economic 
reforms and dealing with the high levels of unemployment and structural imbalances in the economy were not 
enough, the new member states of the EU will also confront a challenge in financing the costs of accession. There 
can be no doubt that the countries that joined the EU in 2004 will, as a group, receive more from the EU than 
they will pay in to the EU in the first years of membership. But the difference between what they receive and what 
they pay in will not be great, either in terms of euros or relative to the size of their economies. Indeed, the EU was 
obliged to provide budgetary compensation to the acceding countries in 2004-06, both in the form of a special 
cash-flow facility and temporary budgetary compensation, to ensure that none of them ended up worse off after 
accession than they had been before accession! 
Table 5 presents the EU’s commitment and payment appropriations for the ten new member states in 
2004 and 2005 as well as their contributions to the EU. For 2004, the EU appropriated 10.4 billion euros in com-
mitments for market measures in agriculture, programs to assist rural development, structural actions, and internal 
policies. Those commitments are expected to rise to 13 billion euros in the 2005 financial year. But actual 
payments appropriated to the new member states will be considerably less, 3.7 billion euros in 2004 and 7.8 billion 
euros in 2005.12 While the full commitments for market measures–-chiefly export refunds and intervention 
                     
10European Commission, 2003b: p. 43. 
11European Commission, 2003b: p. 42. 
12For the data on the commitment and payment appropriations for the ten new member states in 2004 and the  
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measures–and direct aids in agriculture will be paid, only a fraction of the funds committed for rural development 
and from the structural funds and Cohesion fund will be paid in the same financial year. As a result, the 
appropriated payments of 3.7 billion euros in 2004 were only some 400 million more than the 3.3 billion euros 
contributed by the ten new member states 2004. In 2005, the Commission estimated that the ten new member 
states would receive 7.8 billion in payments from the 13 billion committed, 2.3 billion more than their projected 
contributions of 5.5 billion euros. To put the magnitude of the aggregate net benefit of the ten new member 
states–443 million euros in 2004, 2.3 billion euros in 2005–in perspective, the aggregate GDP of the Ten is roughly 
500 billion euros, meaning that their net gain from membership in 2004 and 2005 was equivalent to roughly one-
half of one percent of their aggregate GDP!   
While the ten states that entered the EU in 2004 will, in the aggregate, be net beneficiaries of rather than 
net contributors to the EU in their first three years of membership, the financial terms of accession nevertheless 
were less generous than those granted to previous accession candidates. For one thing, the EU decided that the 
countries that joined in 2004 would make full payment on the various funding resources of the EU as of the first 
day of membership. In contrast, when Greece entered in 1981 it received a five-year diminishing reduction, from 
70 percent to 10 cent, in its payments on the VAT resource. And when Spain and Portugal entered in 1986, they 
received six-year diminishing reductions, from 87 percent to 5 percent, on their payments on the VAT resource, 
and those reductions were applied to the GNP resource as well when it was introduced in 1988. 
The EU did provide temporary budgetary compensation as well as a special cash-flow facility for the ten 
new member states. Counting both forms of compensation, they received 1.4 billion euros in 2004 and were 
budgeted to receive 1.3 billion euros in 2005 and roughly one billion euros in 2006, for a total of 3.7 billion euros 
over three years. All ten received access to the special cash-flow facility, which represents roughly 70 percent of the 
3.7 billion. Four of the ten–Cyprus, Malta, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia–received in addition temporary 
budgetary compensation to ensure that they did not end up worse off than they had been before accession, in the 
sense of contributing more to the EU than they received from it.13 By way of comparison, when Austria, Sweden, 
and Finland–all of which were relatively affluent countries–entered the Union in 1995, they received a total of 2.5 
billion euros in budgetary compensatory payments over four years.  
3.7 billion euros in budgetary compensation in 2004-06 is not, of course, an insignificant amount. But to 
put that amount in perspective, Table 6 lists the compensation received by each in 2004 and 2005 in millions of 
euros and as a proportion of the country’s GDP in 2002. The GDP ratios in Table 6 indicate that in most cases the 
compensation was quite negligible. Indeed, only in three countries–Cyprus and Malta in both years and Hungary in 
2004–did it represent more than 0.4 percent of the country’s GDP. 
  Undoubtedly the single most controversial element in the financial package offered the new member 
states was the decision to phase in full funding under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) over their first decade 
of membership. In early 2002, the Commission proposed an appropriations schedule that, in effect, deprived the 
new member states of full participation in the CAP until 2013.14  A major component of the CAP is the 
reimbursement of direct payments to farmers made by the member states in the previous year. Since the countries 
that joined in 2004 were not members in 2003 they received no reimbursement in 2004 for the direct payments to 
farmers they made in 2003. (This explains the absence in Table 5 of entries for agricultural “Direct Aids” in 2004.) 
 The Commission proposed that in 2005 the new member states should receive reimbursement for their 2004 
                                                                  
Commission’s proposed appropriations for them in 2005, see European Commission, 2004d and 2004e. 
13Three of the four–Cyprus, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic–have the highest GDP per capita among the ten new member 
states. Given the important role of the EU’s GDP  resource, they were therefore required to make relatively large 
contributions to the EU. 
14See European Commission, 2002.  
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direct payments equal to 25 percent of the level they would have received had they been members prior to 2004. 
In the next three years, 2006-08, it proposed that they receive reimbursement for their payments in the previous 
year equal to 30 percent, 35 percent, and 40 percent of the level they would have received had they been members 
prior to 2004. Thereafter, from 2009 to 2014, it proposed that the rate of reimbursement be increased by 10 
percentage points per year until it reached 100 percent reimbursement for the direct payments made in 2013. 
In presenting its proposal for a protracted phase-in of CAP direct payments from a low initial base, the 
Commission claimed that such a scheme was necessary in order to avoid creating disincentives that would delay 
the restructuring of agriculture in the new member states–a process that inevitably involves eliminating many small, 
marginal farms and shifting labor out of that sector and that would in all likelihood generate considerable political 
opposition. In addition, of course, the scheme was politically convenient for the EU, given the EU’s budgetary 
ceiling for the 2000-06 period. But whether a reflection of economic wisdom or political convenience, the scheme 
not only treats the new member states as less than full members of the EU in one highly important program for 
nearly a decade after their accession but deprives them of a substantial amount of revenue over that decade–some 
8 billion euros in the first three years of membership and more than 20 billion euros in the full ten-year period.15 
As a result, while attempting to restructure the agricultural sector and indeed the entire economy, as well as 
developing their administrative capacity, extending the reforms, and dealing with high levels of unemployment and 
structural imbalances in the economy, the new member states will find themselves having to divert funds that 
could otherwise be used for those purposes in order to make payments that in member states that had joined prior 
to 2004 were reimbursed by the EU. At Copenhagen in December 2002, the European Council accepted the 
Commission’s proposal for the ten-year phase-in to full reimbursement of agricultural direct aids starting at the 25 
percent level recommended by the Commission. Under considerable pressure from some of the accession 
candidates–most vociferously, Poland–the Council modified the scheme to allow the new members to “top up” 
the EU’s reimbursement of direct payments to farmers by 30 percent–i.e., bringing the rate of reimbursement up 
to 55 percent in 2005, 60 percent in 2006, 65 percent in 2007, etc. And it agreed that in 2005-07, up to 40 percent 
of the “top-up” payments could be paid out of EU funds received for rural development. (The new member states 
will pay the full amount of any “topping up” thereafter.)  Based on the data in Table 5, if all of the new member 
states “topped up” the EU’s reimbursement in 2005-07 by the maximum amount of 30 percent, that would add 
some 2 billion euros of EU money over the three years to the 5 billion euros the EU will pay according to the 
original schedule. But in return for that additional 2 billion euros, the new member states would have to pay an 
additional 3 billion euros in non-reimbursed direct aids as their share of the “top up” in addition to the 12 billion 
euros they will have to pay according to the original schedule.16 
The impact of this graduated schedule of reimbursement for agricultural direct aids will of course vary 
widely among the new member states. Its impact will be most acute in the new member states that have the lowest 
farm incomes and the largest numbers of farmers. As the earlier data presented in Table 4 suggest the impact will 
                     
15As Table 5 indicates, the Commission’s provisional draft budget for 2005 projects commitments and payments of 1.4 
billion euros for direct aids to farmers. That implies that full reimbursement at the rate received by the states that were 
members of the EU prior to 2004 would equal approximately 5.6 billion euros. That, in turn, implies a loss (either to 
farmers, in the event the national governments do not provide additional aid beyond the amount that is reimbursed, or 
national taxpayers, in the event the governments do provide that additional aid) of 4.2 billion euros in 2005 and 3.9 billion 
euros in 2006. In the absence of a reduction in the number of farmers receiving direct aids over the first decade of 
membership, the Commission’s schedule would result in total payments to the new member states in 2005-14 of 33 billion 
euros compared to 56 billion euros if they received full reimbursement of their payments. 
16Assuming the entry for “Direct Aids” in Table 5 implies the ten new member states paid a total of 5.6 billion euros in such 
aids in 2004, and assuming all ten opted for the maximum “top up” in 2005-07, the “top up” of 30 percent would be 1.7 
billion euros, of which 40 percent, 680 million, would be paid by the EU and 60 percent, 1 billion euros, would be paid by 
the member states.  
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be especially severe on Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and, after 2007, Bulgaria and Romania. In those states–the 
poorest of the countries that joined in 2004 or will join in 2007–the governments will receive significantly less from 
the EU in reimbursement for direct aids to farmers than will those in the member states that joined the EU prior 
to 2004. They will therefore have to either spend unusually large amounts of their own funds in support of 
farmers–meaning they would have to either take funds from other uses or raise taxes–or reduce the amount they 
pay farmers, or both. 
Public Ambivalence about Accession and Enlargement. As daunting as these challenges are, they are 
likely to be accentuated by yet another, one that is essentially political. As the governments of the new member 
states endeavor to deal with the several challenges posed by accession, they are likely to find their capacity to act 
effectively constrained by the considerable ambivalence about, if not opposition to, enlargement and the EU that 
exists in many of the fifteen states that were members prior to May 1, 2004, and, indeed, in their own publics. 
That there is a considerable degree of ambivalence about or opposition to enlargement in the fifteen 
member states of the pre-2004 EU is suggested by the growing electoral popularity in recent years of leaders and 
parties that are skeptical about, if not altogether hostile to, European integration–leaders and parties such as Um-
berto Bossi and the Lega Nord, Silvio Berlusconi and the Forza Italia, Jörg Haider and the Austrian Freedom Party, 
Pim Fortuyn and the party he founded in the Netherlands, Pia Kjaersgaard and the Danish People’s Party, and 
Jean-Marie Le Pen and the Front National. Whether or not those parties participate in government or form part of 
the parliamentary majority–and, with the notable exception of the Front National and the LPF, all of them do 
participate in government or its parliamentary majority–the governments in those countries, and perhaps in others 
as well, are likely to be less willing than they otherwise might be to assist the new member states in meeting the 
challenges of accession. 
Perhaps of even greater consequence for the governments of the new member states as they cope with 
the challenges of accession will be the popularity in their own electorates of leaders and parties that are skeptical 
about the EU. After more than a decade of wrenching social and economic change and the protracted and difficult 
negotiation of accession, such leaders and parties have attracted increased support. Among the more well-known 
examples are the Thatcherite skepticism voiced by the current president of the Czech Republic, Václav Klaus, and 
the party he has led, the Civic Democrats, the euroskepticism of Viktor Orban and Fidesz, the former governing 
party of Hungary, and the unambiguous hostility to the EU voiced by Andrzej Lepper’s Samoobrona movement and 
the ultra-nationalist League of Polish Families. 
  Most recently, the 2004 elections for the European Parliament witnessed increased support for euro-
skeptic parties in many of the twenty-five member states. Perhaps the most dramatic instance occurred in Britain, 
where the UK Independence Party, dedicated to taking the country out of the Union, obtained nearly 17 percent 
of the vote, more than the Liberal Democrats and within six percentage points of the governing Labour Party, and 
twelve seats in the Parliament. But euroskeptic parties did well in a number of other countries as well:  In France, 
four parties–the Front National, the Mouvement pour la France, the Rassemblement pour la France, and Chasse Pêche Nature 
Traditions–won 20 percent of the vote; in Belgium, the Vlaams Blok won 24 percent of the vote in Flanders and ran 
a close second to the Christian Democrats; in the Netherlands, a new party, Europa Transparant, led by Paul van 
Buitenen, an EU whistle-blower, won seven percent of the vote; in Austria, another new party led by another EU 
whistle-blower, Hans-Peter Martin, won 14 percent of the vote; in Ireland, the anti-EU Sinn Fein won more than 
11 percent of the vote and its first seat in the Parliament; in Denmark and Sweden, the anti-EU Juni block and list 
won, respectively, 9 percent and 14 percent of the vote; in Poland, Samoobrona won 11 percent of the vote and the 
League of Polish Families won 16 percent; in the Czech Republic, the Civic Democrats won 30 percent of the vote 
and the anti-EU Communist party won 20 percent; in Hungary, Fidesz won 47 percent of the vote; and in Slovenia, 
the New Slovenia party won 24 percent of the vote.   
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A measure of the extent of ambivalence about or opposition to enlargement that exists in much of the 
EU–in particular, in the fifteen member states that constituted the EU prior to May 1, 2004–is found in the re-
sponses obtained in Eurobarometer surveys conducted in the spring of 2004. Table 7 presents the responses in all 
twenty-five member states to a question asking respondents their views with regard to enlargement.17 These data 
suggest that while there is substantial support for enlargement in several of the states that were members prior to 
2004–most notably, Greece, Ireland, and Spain–there is less support–in some instances, much less support–in other 
member states. In the entire pre-2004 EU, only 42 percent of all respondents said they supported the 2004 
enlargement, while 39 percent said they were against. Less than one-half of the respondents in Finland and the 
Netherlands, and less than 40 percent of the respondents in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Austria, Britain, and 
Germany, supported enlargement, and in all of those countries at least 40 percent of the respondents were 
opposed to the enlargement. In the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Austria, Britain, and Germany, 
the number opposed to enlargement exceeded the number who favored it. In Germany, Austria, and 
Luxembourg, more than 50 percent of the respondents opposed enlargement. Should such patterns of support 
and opposition continue, they are likely to give pause to governments–even those in countries that have not ex-
perienced a surge in support for euroskeptic parties–that might otherwise be inclined to consider some further 
budgetary means of assisting the new entrants in coping with the challenges of accession. 
One observes a dramatically different distribution of support for and opposition to enlargement in the ten 
new member states. Support for enlargement is much greater, ranging as high as 70 to 80 percent in Cyprus, Hun-
gary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Opposition to enlargement is much less widespread than in the 
pre-2004 EU; in only three of the new member states–Latvia, Malta, and Estonia–were more than 14 percent of 
the respondents opposed to enlargement and in no state were more than 20 percent of the respondents opposed 
to enlargement. At one level, of course, the difference between the fifteen pre-2004 member states and the ten new 
member states in the extent of support for and opposition to enlargement is not surprising. On the other hand, the 
magnitude of the difference is surprising when juxtaposed with the similarity that exists between the two groups of 
member states in the extent of support for and opposition to the EU’s common foreign and security policy, a 
common defense policy, EMU, and the new constitution.18  Indeed, among all the issues about which respondents 
were questioned in the Eurobarometer surveys, the greatest difference, by far, between the publics in the pre-2004 
EU and those in the new member states concerns enlargement. 
In Eurobarometer surveys in 2001 and 2002, the support for enlargement in the fifteen states that were 
members of the EU hovered in the range of 50-52 percent. The erosion that occurred in 2003–in the spring of that 
year only 46 percent of EU citizens supported enlargement–may have been a by-product of the tensions that 
appeared between some of the current and prospective member states in the late stages of the accession nego-
tiations and, to an even greater degree, in the weeks and months preceding the war in Iraq. It is possible that, in 
time, those effects will wear off and support for enlargement in the pre-2004 member states will return to the 
range of 50 to 52 percent (or higher). On the other hand, as the data in Table 8 demonstrate, the erosion in net 
support for enlargement, as measured by the change from 2002 to 2004 in the difference in each country between 
the proportions favoring and opposed to enlargement, was considerable and widespread. It was not confined to 
the states–Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg–that were on the frontline of opposition to the U.S. and 
the U.K. with regard to Iraq. (The fact that the net support for enlargement eroded only slightly in France was, of 
course, a function of the fact that it was already at unusually low levels in 2002.)  Nor was it confined to those 
countries and the four neutral member states–Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland–that could have been 
                     
17The exact wording of the question was “What is your opinion on the following statement? Please tell me whether you are 
for it or against it:  The enlargement of the European Union to include ten new countries this May.” The responses are re-
ported in European Commission, 2004b. 
18See European Commission, 2004b.  
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expected to disagree, as a matter of principle, with the support given by most of the prospective member states to 
Britain and the U.S. in the run-up to the war. Rather, the erosion in support for enlargement appears to have been 
an EU-wide phenomenon.  
While the unusually high levels of support for enlargement in the ten new member states suggests that the 
governments in those countries might enjoy a comfortable cushion of support as they address the challenges 
posed by accession, the data in Table 9 suggest that support is quite soft. Table 9 reports the proportions of the 
respondents who said in the spring of 2004 that their country’s membership in the EU would be a “good thing,” a 
“bad thing,” or “neither good nor bad.” One notes that, despite the high levels of support for enlargement, a signi-
ficantly smaller portion of the respondents–only 43 percent in all ten countries–said membership would be a 
“good thing”; 33 percent said membership would be “neither a good thing nor a bad thing”; and 16 percent said it 
would be a “bad thing.” Only in Lithuania and Malta did more than one-half of the respondents say membership 
would be a “good thing.” In Estonia and Latvia, no more than one-third of the respondents took that position.19  
While the proportions saying membership would be a “bad thing” were not large–ranging from 9 percent 
in Slovakia to slightly more than 20 percent in Estonia and Latvia–the proportions saying membership would be 
“neither good nor bad” ranged from 26 percent in Malta to 44 percent in Slovenia. Clearly, despite the unusually 
high degree of support for the 2004 enlargement, a very large proportion of the publics in the new member states 
are not yet convinced that membership in the EU will be a “good thing” for their country. 
Table 10 compares the responses in the ten new member states to this question in 2004 with those of-
fered a year earlier. What stands out above all is the marked erosion in the new member states in the proportion 
saying membership would be a “good thing” and, conversely, the marked increase in most of the states in the pro-
portions saying membership would be “neither good nor bad” or “bad.” The erosion was greatest in Cyprus –no 
doubt a reflection of the bitter conflict between the government and the EU that occurred after the government, 
and then the Greek Cypriots in the referendum of April 2004, rejected the Annan Plan. But it was considerable, 
also, in Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic. Evidently, and again notwithstanding their 
high degree of support for the 2004 enlargement, the publics of the new member states became increasingly 
skeptical about membership in the EU in the run-up to accession.  
Another measure of the skepticism about membership that existed in most of the publics of the new 
member states prior to their accession can be found in the results of the advisory or binding referendums on ac-
cession that took place in nine of the ten countries–all but Cyprus–in 2003. Aside from the first referendum in 
Malta, which was marked by an extraordinarily high turnout (91 percent) and an unusually close vote (54 percent in 
favor of accession), the referendums resulted in surprisingly large majorities, ranging from 67 percent in Estonia 
and Latvia to 90 percent or more in Slovenia, Lithuania, and Slovakia. But as impressive as those large majorities 
were, in most of the countries the “yes” voters represented less than one-half of the electorate. 
Table 11 presents the results of the nine referendums and includes the turnout figures, the proportions of 
voters supporting accession, and the proportions of the electorates voting in favor of accession.20 The data in the 
third column of the table indicate that accession was favored by a substantial majority of the electorate in only two 
                     
19The unusually low degree of support for and high degree of opposition to EU membership in Estonia and Latvia may re-
sult in part from the fact that the Eurobarometer surveys in those countries include non-citizens who are permanent resi-
dents; 25 to 30 percent of the Estonian and Latvian populations are of Russian heritage. Substantial portions of those of 
Russian heritage do not speak the national language, and in part for that reason–ability to function in the national language 
being a condition of citizenship–slightly more than 20 percent of those who are not Estonian or Latvian do not have 
citizenship. (In Lithuania, the situation is quite different. Only about 6 percent of the population is Russian–there are in fact 
more Poles than Russians–and less than 10 percent of those who are not Lithuanian do not have citizenship). 
20The latter figure is, of course, simply the product of the other two.  
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countries–Slovenia and Lithuania. Apart from those two, less than one-half of the electorate in the seven other 
countries endorsed accession. In Hungary, which experienced an unusually low turnout (46 percent), the Czech 
Republic, and Estonia, only about 40 percent of the electorate supported accession, in the sense of being 
sufficiently supportive to turn out and vote in favor. 
A more recent manifestation of apparent apathy that may mask skepticism about if not active opposition 
to the EU occurred in the June 2004 elections for the European Parliament. Most commentators had anticipated 
that, as in the first elections after accession in Spain and Portugal in 1987 and in Austria and Finland in 1996, the 
level of turnout in the ten new member states would be unusually high. In fact, however, as the data in Table 12 
indicate, the turnout in the eight new member states in central and eastern European states was unusually low. 
Among those eight, more than 40 percent of the voters turned out in only two countries–Latvia (41.3 percent) and 
Lithuania (48.4 percent)–and in one of those–Lithuania–turnout may have been high because the presidential 
election took place on the same day. In Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, 
the turnout rate was less than 30 percent–a level of disinterest that had been recorded only once (in Britain in 
1999) in all of the elections for the European Parliament in all of the member states since direct elections 
commenced in 1979. In no other member state has the turnout level in an election for the European Parliament 
reached the low levels recorded in Poland (20.9 percent) and the Slovak Republic (17.0 percent) in 2004.21 In most 
of the new member states–indeed, in all of the new member states from central and eastern Europe except 
Lithuania–the turnout for the European Parliament election in June 2004 was far below that in the most recent 
national election. 
Dissatisfaction with the Way Democracy Works and Distrust of Government. The significant 
degree of skepticism about or indifference or opposition to the EU in most if not all of the central and eastern 
European candidate countries, whether reflected in responses to questions asked in Eurobarometer surveys or in 
abstention or opposition to accession in the 2003 referendums and 2004 European Parliament elections, does not 
mean the new member states will fail to meet the challenges posed by accession. But it does suggest that unless 
there is some as yet unforeseen groundswell of public support in the new member states for membership in the 
EU, the governments of several of the new members will not be able to draw upon an inexhaustible supply of 
political support, and may encounter significant resistance, as they address those challenges. That is likely to be true 
especially, of course, if the EU comes to be regarded as having been punitive or miserly in its terms of accession 
and if, in addressing the various challenges of accession, the governments are required to impose significant costs 
on their citizens. 
The difficulty of maintaining political support as they address the challenges posed by accession is likely to 
be exacerbated by the existence in most of the new member states of a widespread dissatisfaction with the way 
democracy works in the country and an exceptionally low degree of trust in government. Table 13 presents the 
proportions of respondents in the ten new member states and two of the four candidate countries who said they 
were either very or fairly satisfied, or not very or not at all satisfied, with the way democracy works in their 
country.22 The data indicate that less than one-quarter of the respondents in the ten new member states said they 
were very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in their country while nearly three-quarters said they 
were not very or not at all satisfied. By way of comparison, more than one-half of the respondents in the other fif-
                     
21Turnout in the 2004 European Parliament elections in the fifteen pre-2004 member states averaged 45.5 percent and 
ranged from 37-40 percent in the Netherlands, Britain, Sweden, and Portugal to 70 percent in Italy and 90 percent in Bel-
gium and Luxembourg. In Belgium and Luxembourg (and Greece), however, voting is compulsory. In Italy, voting is a civic 
obligation but not compulsory. The overall rate of turnout has dropped in every election since 1979. For a discussion, see 
Cameron, 2005. 
22European Commission, 2004b. In Tables 13 and 14, we have included the results of the Eurobarometer surveys 
conducted in Bulgaria and Romania.  
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teen member states said they were very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in their country and only 
slightly more than 40 percent said they were not very or not at all satisfied.23 
In Cyprus and Malta, substantial majorities said they were satisfied with the way democracy works in the 
country. But in no other country among the ten that joined the EU in 2004 did more than 43 percent of the 
respondents say they were satisfied with the way democracy worked. In Hungary, Estonia, and Lithuania, only 30 
percent of the respondents said they were satisfied with the way democracy worked while between 56 to 66 per-
cent said they were dissatisfied. In Poland and the Slovak Republic, as well as in Bulgaria and Romania, less than 
20 percent of the respondents said they were satisfied with the way democracy worked while roughly 80 percent or 
more said they were dissatisfied!  Whether a reflection of the rather brief existence of democratic politics in the 
post-Communist era, the accumulation of grievances generated by the economic and social policies pursued by 
democratic governments over the past decade, shortcomings in the design of the institutions of post-Communist 
democracy, or the performance of particular governments, the extensive dissatisfaction with the way democracy 
works in the new member states and candidate countries of central and eastern Europe can only exacerbate the 
political difficulties their governments will face as they try to address the challenges posed by accession.  
The high levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy has worked in the new member states of central 
and eastern Europe are accompanied by equally high levels of distrust in the national government. As the data in 
Table 14 indicate, only 17 percent of the respondents in the Eurobarometer surveys conducted in the ten new 
member states in the spring of 2004 said they tended to trust the national government. Almost three-quarters–74 
percent–said they tended to distrust their national government. Except in Estonia, in none of the new member 
states of central and eastern Europe does the proportion of respondents saying they tend to trust the government 
exceed 31 percent, and in several–most notably, the Slovak Republic and Poland–the proportions are much lower. 
In the Slovak Republic, only 17 percent said they tended to trust the government while 75 percent said they tended 
to distrust the government. In Poland, only 7 percent said they tended to trust the government while 85 percent 
said they tended to distrust the government. With such high levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy 
works and distrust of government, it would be surprising if the governments were able to marshall sufficient 
support over sufficiently long periods to introduce and implement the policies required to successfully address the 
challenges posed by accession. Indeed, with such depleted stocks of political capital, the near-term prospect for 
many of these countries is likely to be, instead, electoral volatility as dissatisfied and distrustful voters shift from 
one party to another, unstable governments of short duration as voters abandon governing parties in favor of their 
opponents, and a growing backlog of unmet challenges deriving from membership in the EU. 
 Conclusion 
This paper has considered five challenges that will be faced by the central and eastern European states 
that joined the EU in 2004 or will join it in the near future. One involves the ability to develop the administrative 
capacity necessary to implement the acquis. A second involves the ability to extend and deepen the reforms that will 
eventually result in the transformation of their economies into market-oriented systems comparable to and com-
petitive with those in the current EU. A third involves the ability to reduce the high levels of unemployment while 
also addressing the underlying structural imbalances that have given rise to large government, trade, and current 
account deficits. A fourth involves the ability to finance the transition to membership in the face of the less-than-
generous terms offered by the EU. 
To a considerable degree, the ability of the governments of the new member states to address successfully 
these challenges will depend ultimately upon their ability to surmount a fifth challenge–the political one posed by 
the considerable skepticism about, and even outright opposition to, their accession that exists not only in their own 
polities but throughout the EU. Over the long run, the extent to which accession succeeds or fails is likely to 
                     
23European Commission, 2004b.  
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depend, more than anything else, on how well the governments of the new member states are able to persist in 
their efforts to administer the acquis, deepen the reform and transformation of the economy, reduce the high levels 
of unemployment and the high budget, trade, and current account deficits, and finance the costs of accession in 
the face of that skepticism and opposition. But that may depend, ultimately, on the stock of political capital on 
which governments can draw as they attempt to institute painful reforms. And as we have seen, that stock is 
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Czech R.   4.3  4.3  4.3  4.0  3.7  3.3  3.0  3.0 
Estonia 4.3  4.0  4.3  4.0  3.7  3.3  3.3  2.7 
Hungary 4.3  4.3  4.3  4.0  3.3  3.7  3.0  3.0 
Latvia 4.3  4.3  4.3  3.3  3.7.  3.0  3.0  2.7 
Lithuania 4.3  4.3  4.3  3.7  3.0  3.0  3.0.  3.0 
Poland 4.3  4.3  4.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.7  3.0 
Slovak R.   4.3  4.3  4.3  4.0  3.3  3.0  2.7  3.0 
Slovenia 4.3  4.0  4.3  3.0  3.3  3.0  2.7  2.7 
Bulgaria 4.3  4.3  3.7  3.7  3.3  2.7  2.3  2.3 
Croatia 4.3  4.0  4.3  3.3  3.7  2.7  2.7  2.3 
Romania 4.0  4.3  3.7  3.3  2.7  2.0  2.0  2.3 
Average 4.3  4.2  4.2  3.6  3.4  2.0  2.9  2.7 





Table 2: Economic Forecasts for the Ten New Member States and Bulgaria and Romania, 2004-05        
 %  Change  GDP      
      
% Unemployed      
         
% GDP, Gov’t 
Deficit      
% GDP, Trade Deficit 
  2004 2005 2004 2005 2004  2005 2004  2005 
Cyprus  3.4 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.6 4.1 25.4  25.4
Czech  Republic 2.9 3.4 8.2 8.2 5.9 5.1 2.8  2.8
Estonia  5.4 5.9 9.7 9.6 (0.7) 0.0 18.4  17.4
Hungary  3.2 3.4 5.7 5.6 4.9 4.3 4.1  3.1
Latvia 6.2  6.2  10.3 10.1 2.2 2.0 20.7  22.3
Lithuania 6.9  6.6  11.5 10.7 2.8 2.6 9.1  9.2
Malta  1.4 2.0 8.6 8.1 5.9 4.5 18.3  17.9
Poland 4.6  4.8  19.6 19.3 6.0 4.5 2.8  3.5
Slovak Republic  4.0  4.1  16.5 15.9 4.1 3.9 2.8  3.5
Slovenia  3.2 3.6 6.4 6.2 1.7 1.8 2.7  2.7
Bulgaria 5.0  5.5  12.5 11.0 0.7 1.0 10.0*  10.0*
Romania  5.1 5.3 7.6 7.3 3.0 3.0 8.0*  8.0*
Source: European Commission, 2004a. * = estimate.  
 
Table 3:  Trade Between the Accession Candidates and the EU, 2002 
  % of All Exports  
Going to the EU 
% of All Imports 
From the EU 
Trade Deficit  
with the EU   
(Million euros)
Cyprus 48.0  55.8 2,173
Czech Republic  68.4  60.2 1,673
Estonia 68.0  57.9 847
Hungary 75.1  56.3 (68)
Latvia 60.4  53.0 620
Lithuania 48.4  44.5 1,290
Malta 46.6  67.0 1,575
Poland 68.7  61.7 9,165
Slovak Republic  60.  0.3 (982)
Slovenia 59.4  68.0 1,806
Bulgaria 55.6  50.2 606
Croatia 52.9  55.8 n.a.
Romania 67.1  58.4 1,003




The Level of Income and the Size and Productivity of the Agricultural Sector 
in the Ten Post-Communist Accession Candidates, 2002 
   Agriculture 







Cyprus 72  5.3  4.3 
Czech 
Republic 
60 4.9  3.7 
Estonia 42  6.5  5.4* 
Hungary 57  6.0  4.3 
Latvia 35  15.3  4.7 
Lithuania 39  18.6  7.1 
Malta 55**  2.3*  2.8 
Poland 39  19.6  3.1 
Slovakia 47  6.6  4.5 
Slovenia 74  9.7  3.3* 
Bulgaria 25  20.7*** 12.5 
Romania 25  37.7  13.0 
Source: European Commission, 2003b: p. 42. 
*:   2001 
**:  1999 
***: estimate 18 
 
 
Table 5: EU Commitment and Payment Appropriations to, and Contributions of,  
the Ten New Member States, 2004-05 
(Million euros)                                                                   
 2004  2005 
 Commitments Payments  Commitments  Payments 
Agriculture:        
  Market Measures  287 287 300 300 
  Direct Aids   –  – 1,394 1,394 
  Rural Development  1,733 645 1,931 1,369 
  TOTAL  2,020 932 3,625 3,063 
       
Structural Actions:   
  Structural Funds  3,812 1,702 5,355 3,093 
  Cohesion Fund  2,897 158 2,394 671 
  TOTAL  6,709 1,860 7,749 3,764 
       
Internal Policies:  1,633 904 1,600 967 
       
TOTAL 10,362 3,696 12,974 7,794 
       
Total Contributions, 
10 New Member States 
3,253 5,516 
       
Net Benefit,  
10 New Member States 
443 2,278 
        
Budgetary compensation to 
10 New Member States 
1,410 1,305 
Source: European Commission, 2004d and 2004e.  
Table 6 
EU Budgetary Compensation to Ten New Member States in 2004 and 2005 
 2004  2005 
  Million euros  % of GDP Million euros % of GDP
Cyprus 107  1.0 138 1.3
Czech Republic  332  0.4 300 0.4
Estonia 17  0.2 3 <0.1
Hungary 172  2.5 31 0.4
Latvia 22  0.2 4 <0.1
Lithuania 39  0.3 7 <0.1
Malta 55  1.3 103 2.5
Poland 490  0.2 612 0.3
Slovakia 70  0.3 13 <0.1
Slovenia 105  0.4 94 0.4
Total 1,410  0.3 1,305 0.3
Source: European Commission, 2004d and 2004e . GDP ratios based on GDP in 2002. 
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(% of Respondents) 
   For  Against Don’t 
Know 
Greece 66  19  15 
Ireland 60  22  18 
Spain 59  18  23 
Denmark 59  31  10 
Italy 55  25  20 
Sweden 54  37  9 
Portugal 52  27  21 
Finland 48  44  8 
Netherlands 44  45  11 
Belgium 38  49  13 
France 37  47  16 
Luxembourg 37  51  13 
Austria 34  52  14 
United Kingdom  31  40  29 
Germany 28  56  16 
      
EU 15  42  39  19 
      
Cyprus 80  7  13 
Slovak Republic  80  7  13 
Slovenia 79  11  10 
Hungary 74  10  16 
Poland 72  14  14 
Malta 68  17  15 
Lithuania 67  9  24 
Latvia 67  15  18 
Czech Republic  63  14  23 
Estonia 58  20  22 
      
10 New Member States  71  13  16 
Source: European Commission, 2004b. 20 
 
 
Table 8: Change in Net Support for Enlargement in the EU,  
Autumn 2002 to Spring 2004 
 % For - % Against 
  Autumn 2002  Spring 2004 Change
Greece 59  47 -12
Denmark 52  28 -24
Ireland 52  38 -14
Spain 49  41 -  8
Italy 45  30 -15
Sweden 42  17 -25
Portugal 40  25 -15
Netherlands 30  -1 -31
Finland 27  4 -23
Luxembourg 22  -14 -36
Belgium 20  -11 -31
Austria 20  -18 -38
Germany 12  -28 -40
United Kingdom  10  -9 -19
France -8  -10 -2
  
EU 15  22   3 -19




Support for EU Membership in the Ten New Member States, 
Spring 2004                         







Lithuania 52  30  12 
Malta 50  26  16 
Slovakia 46  39  9 
Hungary 45  32  15 
Cyprus 42  38  16 
Poland 42  33  18 
Czech Republic  41  28  17 
Slovenia 40  44  13 
Latvia 33  38  22 
Estonia 31  39  21 
      
10 new members  43  33  16 




Table 10: Change in Proportions of Respondents in Ten New Member States  
Saying EU Membership is “Good,” “Neither Good nor Bad,” or “Bad,”  
Spring 2003 to Spring 2004 







Cyprus -30  +17  +12 
Lithuania  -13  + 7  + 3 
Hungary  -18  + 9  + 8 
Poland -19  +10  +11 
Slovakia  -13  + 9  + 4 
Slovenia -17  +11  +  6 
Malta  - 1  + 2  - 3 
Czech Republic  - 5  - 4  + 4 
Latvia  - 4  - 2  + 7 
Estonia  0  - 3  + 5 
Source: European Commission, 2003c and 2004b 
 
 
Table 11: Results of the 2003 Referenda on Accession to the EU 
  % of Electorate 
Voting in Referendum 
% of Voters voting 
in favor of Accession
% of Electorate 




91 54  49 
Slovenia  
(March 23) 
60 90  54 
Hungary 
(April 12) 
46 84  39 
Lithuania  
(May 10-11) 
63 91  57 
Slovakia 
(May 16-17) 
52 93  48 
Poland 
(June 7-8) 
59 78  46 
Czech Republic 
(June 13-14) 
55 77  42 
Estonia 
(Sept. 14) 
64 67  43 
Latvia 
(Sept. 20) 
73 67  49 
Source:  European Commission, Official results. 
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Table 12: Voter Turnout in Most Recent National Election and  
2004 European Parliament Election in the Ten New Member States 
 %  Turnout 







Czech Republic  58.0 28.3
Estonia 58.2 26.8
Poland 46.3 20.9
Slovak Republic  70.0 17.0
  
Other 15  45.5
Source: European Commission, 2004c. 
*  :  Voting is compulsory in Cyprus. 
** : In Malta, local elections took place on the same day as the European Parliament election.  
In Lithuania, the presidential election took place on the same day as the European Parliament election. 
 
Table 13: The Extent of Public Satisfaction with the Way Democracy  
Works in the Country, in Ten New Member States and  
Two Candidate Countries, Spring 2004 
 %  Very/Fairly 
Satisfied 
% Not Very/Not 
at All Satisfied 
Cyprus 75  23 
Malta 56  40 
Czech Republic  43  53 
Slovenia 43  55 
Latvia 35  56 
Hungary 31  66 
Estonia 30  63 
Lithuania 29  62 
Slovakia 18  80 
Poland 16  83 
    
10 New Member States  24  73 
    
Bulgaria 19  75 
Romania 18  80 





Table 14: Trust in the National Government in the Ten New Member States 
and Two Candidate Countries, Spring 2004 
  % of Respondents Saying that They Tend to: 
  Trust National Government Not Trust National Government 
Cyprus 75  21 
Malta 49  39 
Estonia 45  44 
Lithuania 31  59 
Hungary 31 58 
Latvia 28  63 
Slovenia 27 66 
Czech Republic  25  64 
Slovak Republic  17  75 
Poland 7  85 
    
10 New Member States  17  74 
    
Bulgaria 19 72 
Romania 36  54 
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